the compounding costs of California’s year-after-year wildfires

The compounding costs of California’s year-after-year wildfires are making it increasingly difficult for any party to absorb the expenses.

So observes Mark Cooper, Yale PhD, former Yale University and Fulbright Fellow, and Senior Research Fellow for Economic Analysis at the Institute for Energy and the Environment of Vermont Law School currently working on Energy Assessment.

PG&E electrical equipment, including power lines and poles, has been found to be responsible for at least 17 of 21 major Northern California fires of autumn 2017.

While the cause of California’s Camp Fire has not yet been determined, PG&E, one of California’s largest utilities, disclosed to the SEC on 9 November that an outage and damage to a transmission tower were reported in the area shortly before the fire started.

In the SEC Form 8-K of 9 November, PG&E declared that it may face billions of dollars in potential liabilities, far more than its insurance would cover, for the wildfires of 2018.

The Form 8-K reads, in pertinent part:

On November 8, 2018, a wildfire began near the city of Paradise, Butte County, California (the “Camp Fire”), located in the service territory of the Utility.  The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection’s (“Cal Fire”) Camp Fire Incident Report dated November 13, 2018, 7:00 a.m. Pacific Time (the “incident report”), indicated that the Camp Fire had consumed 125,000 acres and was 30% contained.  Cal Fire estimates in the incident report that the Camp Fire will be fully contained on November 30, 2018.  In the incident report, Cal Fire reported 42 fatalities.  The incident report also indicates the following: structures threatened, 15,500; single residences destroyed, 6,522; single residences damaged, 75; multiple residences destroyed, 85; commercial structures destroyed, 260; commercial structures damaged, 32; and other minor structures destroyed, 772.

The cause of the Camp Fire is under investigation. On November 8, 2018, the Utility submitted an electric incident report to the California Public Utilities Commission (the “CPUC”) indicating that “on November 8, 2018 at approximately 0615 hours, PG&E experienced an outage on the Caribou-Palermo 115 kV Transmission line in Butte County. In the afternoon of November 8, PG&E observed by aerial patrol damage to a transmission tower on the Caribou-Palermo 115 kV Transmission line, approximately one mile north-east of the town of Pulga, in the area of the Camp Fire. This information is preliminary.” Also on November 8, 2018, acting governor Gavin Newsom issued an emergency proclamation for Butte County, due to the effect of the Camp Fire.

As previously reported, during the third quarter of 2018, PG&E Corporation and the Utility renewed their liability insurance coverage for wildfire events in an aggregate amount of approximately $1.4 billion for the period from August 1, 2018 through July 31, 2019. For more information about wildfire insurance and risks associated with wildfires, see PG&E Corporation and the Utility’s quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2018.

While the cause of the Camp Fire is still under investigation, if the Utility’s equipment is determined to be the cause, the Utility could be subject to significant liability in excess of insurance coverage that would be expected to have a material impact on PG&E Corporation’s and the Utility’s financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, and cash flows.

United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 8-K, filed by PG&E on 9 November 2018

Citigroup estimates that PG&E’s exposure to liability for at least 17 of 21 major Norther California fires that took place in autumn 2017 is $15 billion. Citigroup estimates further that if it is found responsible for the Camp Fire, PG&E could face another $15 billion in claims. This number could rise, the fire is as yet only partially contained.

PG&E’s customers, both business and residential, may find themselves responsible for covering the bill for the company’s liabilities through higher costs.

California state  legislators took steps this year to shield PG&E and the state’s other investor-owned utilities from overwhelming legal claims, allowing them to pass the expense on to ratepayers.

California Senate Bill 901, signed into law on 21 September 2018, applies to fires beginning in 2019, and to some that occurred in 2017.

The bill enables utilities to sell bonds to cover liability costs and pay them off over time through higher rates.

(14) The existing restructuring of the electrical services industry provides for the issuance of rate reduction bonds by the California Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank for the recovery of transition costs, as defined, by electrical corporations. Existing law authorizes the PUC to issue financing orders, to support the issuance of recovery bonds, as defined, by the recovery corporation, as defined, secured by a dedicated rate component, to finance the unamortized balance of the regulatory asset awarded Pacific Gas and Electric Company in PUC Decision 03-12-035.

This bill would, under specific circumstances, authorize the PUC, upon application by an electrical corporation, to issue financing orders to support the issuance of recovery bonds to finance costs, in excess of insurance proceeds, incurred, or that are expected to be incurred, by an electrical corporation, excluding fines and penalties, related to wildfires, as provided.

SB 901, Dodd. Wildfires.

PG&E’s company shares dropped by more than 20 percent yesterday (Wednesday). More than half of its market value has been lost since late last week as the fires have spread.

Shares of other investor-owned utilities in California, Edison International (operated Southern California Edison) and Sempra Energy (owns San Diego Gas and Electric), dropped earlier this week.

California’s power supply is likely not to be at risk. PG&E could face bankruptcy if it cannot cover the liabilities it faces. Such a bankruptcy would eliminate shareholders’ equity and affect bondholder investments.

See:

California Utility Customers May Be on the Hook for Billions in Wildfire Damage,” Ivan Penn and Peter Eavis, The New York Times, 14 November 2018

SEC Form 8-K filed by PG&E, dated 9 November 2018

California Senate Bill No. 901

Houston, Harvey, & post-natural-disaster residential patterns

Sarah Zhang of The Atlantic spoke with Princeton University and UCLA economist Leah Boustan about Houston and Hurricane Harvey. They discussed to what extent the natural disaster that befell Houston might serve as an impetus for residents of Houston to migrate, to move elsewhere.

Dr. Boustan and her colleagues Matthew Kahn, Paul Rhode, and Maria Lucia Yanguas have tracked the effect of natural disasters on economic activity in US counties. Their study has included an examination of migration after 5,000 natural disasters in the United States between 1920 and 2010.

The following excerpts follow Ms. Zhang’s transcription of Dr. Boustan’s discussion.

Risk & infrastructure

Boustan: We do find a migration response to an event like that. But for a very severe disaster—and Harvey looks like it’s going to be in that category—the response is twice as large.

Part of that has to do with people learning about the risk factors. Maybe they didn’t know the area they’re living in is so susceptible to storms.

Part of it is watching whether the existing infrastructure really works. There’s discussions now about Houston not really having enough of a drainage system. People might have known, yes, there are tropical storms, but they may not have understood the tropical storm is going to be such a devastating effect.

FEMA & centralized disaster response

Boustan: FEMA started in the early ’70s, and it gets its own independent status as an agency in ’78. We looked at before and after the ’70s, there was a hypothesis, well—and I’ve heard a lot of this post-Harvey—that when you have centralized disaster response, there’s not really an incentive to move out.

Moral hazard

Zhang: This is the idea of “moral hazard”: When you’re protected from the consequences of your actions, you take more risks.

Boustan: Right, like there’s going to be big government payout, and that encourages people to stay put in places that are risky. You know you’ll get your FEMA payout. We actually didn’t have any difference of course in the migration response before and after FEMA.

Centralized government response & disasters are getting worse

Boustan: But of course, this is really just a before and after, and there’s a lot things about the ’40s, ’50s, and ’60s, that could be different about the ’80s, ’90s, and 2000s. In particular, you can really see the number of disasters and severity of disasters increasing. There are two things going on that could be kind of confounding. On one hand, there’s government response. On the other hand, disaster activity is getting worse. We can’t really separate those two things, but it looks like because disasters are getting worse, there’s just as much of a migration response more recently than there was in the ’30s, ’40s, and ’50s.

See:

Will People Return to Houston After Hurricane Harvey?” | Sarah Zhang, The Atlantic, 3 September 2017

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